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VULNERABILITY AS A CATEGORY OF HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS: INITIAL THOUGHTS IN TRIBUTE TO
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN
Deborah Dinner∗
INTRODUCTION
Take a closer look at a physical copy of Martha Albertson Fineman’s recent
book series and you will notice that the cover art is a print of one of Martha’s
own etchings.1 The print shows two faces, one staring intently at the viewer and
the other looking to the side. The faces are not isolated; rather, they are
connected by intersecting and overlapping spherical lines. Trees and leaves
encircle and, perhaps, protect the faces. For me, the emotions evoked by the
etchings include curiosity, warmth, forthrightness, creativity, and an awareness
of relationship to other people and to the environment. Martha possesses these
qualities, as a scholar and colleague. As an artistic medium, furthermore,
etchings draw viewers’ attention to negative spaces as well as positive lines. This
is the quality of Martha’s scholarship that is, for me, most inspiring and
generative. Martha has a knack for rendering visible the negative spaces—the
dimensions of law and social life that others are missing.
Over the last decade, Professor Fineman has turned her attention to one such
negative space: vulnerability in the human condition. In 2008, she published The
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition.2 This essay,
since cited by more than 150 law-review articles and countless book chapters,
presented Fineman’s critique of the limits of antidiscrimination law and argued
that recognition of universal human vulnerability should serve as the ethical
foundation for a more responsive state.3 In the last decade, vulnerability theory
has evolved considerably, but I will start my remarks with a brief overview of
this landmark essay.
Fineman’s piece starts with a familiar critique: that the formal conception of
equality in U.S. antidiscrimination law—same treatment for similarly situated
∗
Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. I am grateful for feedback from Teemu Ruskola
and for the gifted editorial assistance from Mary Christine Brady, Janiel Myers, and the staff at the Emory Law
Journal.
1
VULNERABILITY AND THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK (Martha Albertson Fineman & Jonathan
W. Fineman eds., 2018).
2
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
3
Id.
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individuals—has proved wholly inadequate either to challenge structures of
subordination or to remedy socioeconomic inequality.4 She draws attention to
the way in which the rhetorical prominence of antidiscrimination, as our legal
culture’s dominant frame for justice and injustice, reinforces the perceived
legitimacy of a restrained state. Putting a twist on our understanding of the
public–private divide, she argues that the contemporary state has not withered.
Rather, the state refrains from using its formidable coercive authority to
guarantee substantive equality.5
The essay then proceeds to chart wholly new territory in legal scholarship:
universal and constant human vulnerability. Of crucial importance, Fineman
departs from the popular conception of vulnerability as signaling the
“victimhood, deprivation, dependency, or pathology” of particular groups.6
Rather, the essay advances the radical notion that vulnerability is a universal and
constant aspect of the condition.7 Vulnerability, she explains, “should be
understood as arising from our embodiment,” which carries with it the capacity
for “harm, injury, and misfortune . . . whether accidental, intentional, or
otherwise.”8 Vulnerability also stems from individuals’ differential location in
social, economic, and political institutions. For this reason, while vulnerability
is universal, Fineman reasons, its manifestations in specific individuals’
experiences are particular and varying.
In my own view, Fineman’s thoughts about the simultaneous universality
and particularity of vulnerability offer fruitful terrain for further scholarship.
Scholars may explore the points of overlap and departure between Fineman’s
theory and critical-race and feminist theories. The latter view vulnerability as
institutionally produced and, generally, challenge universalist theories as
insufficiently attentive to the construction and deployment of power. It seems
that these two approaches to vulnerability may be compatible—a view that
should not be surprising given the long and profound role Fineman has played
in the development of critical theory within the legal academy. Existential
vulnerability, if understood as particular in its manifestation, may support
theoretical insights into the institutional production of vulnerability. Fineman
and critical theorists of vulnerability similarly highlight the ways in which both

4
5
6
7
8

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
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state and civic society institutions construct privilege and disadvantage.9 Indeed,
Fineman herself argues that it is not identity traits, themselves, that produce
inequality. Rather, “systems of power and privilege . . . interact to produce webs
of advantages and disadvantages.”10
Fineman’s project, however, is ultimately constructive rather than critical.11
In keeping with her laudable pragmatism, Fineman’s theory calls for a
responsive state that promotes both human and institutional resilience.
Vulnerability theory argues that the state has a responsibility to promote
resilience by facilitating the just distribution of physical assets such as material
resources, human assets such as education and health care, and social assets such
as strong, functional families and communities.12 For the purposes of this Essay,
however, I will focus on the concept of human vulnerability rather than its
cognate—resilience.
Even at this early stage, the reader might wonder: why does the author,
whose primary intellectual identity lies within the field of legal history, find this
particular piece of legal theory so compelling? Here is the answer: Fineman’s
theory is of considerable interest to legal historians because it is fundamentally
concerned with how we should re-theorize law given the inevitability of change
over time. I take the occasion of this tribute issue honoring Martha Albertson
Fineman’s oeuvre to outline some ideas about the significance of vulnerability
theory as a category of analysis in legal history. To begin, vulnerability theory
makes historical analysis critical to law by placing historical change (and not
just originalist inquiry) at the core of legal analysis. Vulnerability theory draws
our attention to the fact that human beings are constantly susceptible to change,
both positive and negative, in our bodily, social, and environmental
circumstances. Vulnerability theory, therefore, reconceives the universal
political–legal subject as dynamic rather than static, materially fragile, and
socially interdependent. Vulnerability theory is thus well-suited to legal history
because it foregrounds temporality as a means to understand social experience
as well as institutional arrangements under law. The theory demonstrates that
any theory of social justice must account for change over time.
9
See id. at 18 (arguing that one advantage of vulnerability theory over antidiscrimination analysis is the
attention it brings to how institutions allocate assets).
10
Id. at 16.
11
This may stem from what I view as Fineman’s personal commitment to political pragmatism. This a
quality I have observed over the last three years in discussing subjects with Martha that have ranged from the
travesties of the 2016 presidential election and its consequences to far more mundane institutional squabbles.
12
Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics, in
VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 13, 22–24 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013).
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Even as it demonstrates the relevance of temporality for legal theory,
vulnerability theory demands that historians pay greater attention to the
persistence of enduring and constant human needs across time. Over the last
three decades, critical-race and feminist theory has informed historical
scholarship by showing how ideas about identity and difference have structured
social–legal institutions. Vulnerability theory, I would argue, challenges
historians to examine how history is shaped, too, by what Fineman terms
inevitable, biological dependency across the life course as well as the derivative
dependency of caregivers. These existential characteristics have provoked
varied and shifting institutional and legal responses over time.13 The question
for legal historians is how and why law has constructed and reconstructed the
institutional arrangements of dependency. Accordingly, recognition of
vulnerability can offer new ways to organize historical periodization and
theories of causation.
This Essay uses an illustrative example from my own scholarship to
demonstrate the capacity for vulnerability theory to enrich legal history. It
analyzes the legal construction and obfuscation of vulnerability in the U.S.
“welfare regime”: the public as well as private arrangements that order social
provisioning. As a short Essay meant to provoke rather than to answer questions,
the piece is necessarily cursory in its treatment of historical causation,
controversies, and patterns. First, I outline the relationship between gender and
vulnerability in the liberal welfare regime, premised on concepts of feminine
vulnerability and masculine independence. Second, I discuss the ways in which
the neoliberal welfare regime assumes invulnerability: it valorizes sex neutrality,
while reinforcing private responsibility for dependency. Third, I use
vulnerability theory to help illuminate a historical path not taken: the
transformation of the welfare regime according to the model of the universal,
interdependent caregiver rather than the universal, autonomous breadwinner.
Throughout this brief exposition, I endeavor to explain how Fineman’s
theoretical insights inform my own methodology and analysis as a legal
historian.

13
See generally JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF
AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE (3rd prtg. 2006) (describing the origins of private health insurance
and employee benefits); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992) (explaining why the United States became a maternalist welfare
state in the Progressive Era, providing assistance to mothers and their children, rather than a paternalist welfare
state that extended social insurance to all workingmen and their families); Kristin A. Collins, “Petitions Without
Number”: Widows’ Petitions and the Early Nineteenth-Century Origins of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements,
31 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (2013) (describing the historical origins of widows’ pensions in response to the economic
vulnerability of Civil War widows).
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GENDERED VULNERABILITY IN THE LIBERAL WELFARE REGIME

Fineman’s vulnerability theory is initially useful to the legal historian as a
conceptual foil that helps expose historical ideas about vulnerability. Fineman
argues that the concept of universal vulnerability may function “as a heuristic
device . . . to examine hidden assumptions and biases that shaped its original
social and cultural meanings.”14 My own scholarship explores how ideologies
of gender, race, and class have produced ideas about differential vulnerability.15
Holding in mind the idea of universal vulnerability aids historical inquiry into
how law and policy differentially responds to human needs.
To understand the ideological construction of vulnerability in the welfare
regime, we need to shift the institutional focus of conventional legal historical
scholarship. Legal historians today are building a robust field of scholarship
analyzing the administrative state.16 Fineman’s scholarship is amenable to this
project, as it turns legal scholars’ attention from courts toward legislatures and
administrative agencies. Fineman is not concerned with rights that function as
“trumps,”17 so much as democratic deliberation about competing needs; nor is
she concerned with freedom so much as she is with responsibility. I have found
this orientation generative in examining the legal history of the welfare state.
In the first half of the twentieth century, policymakers’ “gendered
imagination” shaped their creation of a liberal labor and social welfare regime.18
Reformers, legislators, and judges mapped ideas about feminine vulnerability
and masculine invulnerability onto the nation’s federalist constitutional system.
Policymakers viewed women as uniquely and inherently vulnerable because of
both their biology and their social role; maternalist labor protections responded
to feminine, rather than universal, vulnerability. Policymakers, by contrast, built

14

Fineman, supra note 2, at 9.
See generally Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment Discrimination Law in the
Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L.J. 1059 (2017) (analyzing how neoliberal interpretations of sex discrimination law
came to legitimate cutbacks in labor protections); Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights
Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79 (2016) (describing how groups of divorced fathers
shaped law and policy responsive to their own vulnerability and that of their children).
16
There are numerous outstanding examples; for recent work see generally JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE
UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL (2012); NICHOLAS R.
PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–
1940 (2013); GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE
(2016); KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–
1972 (2016).
17
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1978).
18
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 5–6 (2001).
15
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federal labor law on the model of the white, male industrial worker, presumed
independent and only episodically vulnerable.
During the Progressive Era, social feminists and their allies wielded a
gendered discourse of vulnerability as a means to circumvent Lochnerian
constitutional jurisprudence. In this period, courts regularly used a substantive
interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down protective labor regulation as a violation of workers’ freedom of
contract.19 Progressive reformers argued that women’s particular physical
vulnerability, as well as their unequal bargaining position in the labor market
and the public interest in protection the health of mothers, justified sex-based
labor standards.20
They won their first major legal victory with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1908
Muller v. Oregon decision, upholding a maximum-hours law for women
workers.21 The Court reasoned that stark differences existed between the sexes
both “in structure of body” and the socio-legal capacity for “the self-reliance
which enables one to assert full rights.”22 In essence, the Court affirmed concepts
of embodied sex difference and also recognized the state’s interest in protecting
the health and well-being of mothers.23 The construction of gendered
vulnerability provided the constitutional rationale for a maternalist regime of
labor protection.
In Muller’s wake, state legislatures took up the mantle of maternalism and
instituted a regime of sex-based protective labor laws. “By the early 1920s, all
but four states had enacted” sex-based limits on women’s work hours.24
Massachusetts passed the first minimum-wage law for women in 1912, and
fourteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico followed on its heels.25
These laws had dual effects. They mitigated the exploitation of working-class
women who lacked the protection of unions and who had little bargaining power
19
See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 101–46 (1993).
20
On the maternalist legal strategy to circumvent freedom of contract ideology, see VIVIEN HART, BOUND
BY OUR CONSTITUTION 63–129 (1994); NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF: PROTECTIVE LAWS FOR
WOMEN WORKERS, 1890S–1990S 18–25 (2015); Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The
Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1905–1923,
78 J. AM. HIST. 188 (1991).
21
208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908).
22
Id. at 422.
23
Of course, maternalist labor laws involved exclusions that had racialized effects. Therefore, the Court
affirmed protection for some, but not all, mothers.
24
Dorothy Sue Cobble, Economic Justice for All: Some Jersey Roots, N.J. STUD., Summer 2016, at 4.
25
Id.
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to negotiate for humane work conditions. At the same time, employers and
unions deployed sex-specific labor standards to entrench gender segregation in
the labor market.26 In addition, maternalist labor laws excluded some of the most
precarious women workers in domestic and agricultural jobs held, in large part,
by women of color. Social feminists and progressive reformers, however, hoped
that this maternalist regime would provide a foundation for a universal labor
regime, protecting male and female workers alike in all sectors of the economy.27
The liberal labor and welfare regime, by contrast, presumed white men’s
independence. Their status derived at once from their autonomy from
government interference, their capacity to provide for dependent wives and
children, and their ability to counteract employer power through voluntary
organization.28 The ideology of masculine independence limited the scope of the
welfare regime that developed in the first half of the twentieth century.
Policymakers viewed state intervention in the employment relationship as
aberrational rather than as normative. During the Progressive Era, advocates
justified workmen’s compensation as necessary to meet the needs of dependent
family members in an era of increased industrial accidents.29 Yet, during the
New Deal, ideas about masculine independence led the labor movement and
prominent social scientists to oppose legislative proposals that would have
guaranteed unemployment insurance for all workers. Instead, they supported a
legislative scheme that made unemployment insurance, in large part, the
responsibility of private employers, tying eligibility to patterns of workforce
attachment that excluded most minorities and women.30 In the postwar period,
only five states (Rhode Island, California, New York, New Jersey, and Hawaii)
and Puerto Rico implemented state temporary disability insurance schemes.31
Legislative recognition for regular periods of sickness was at odds with the ideal
of the independent, masculine worker. Advocates for national health insurance
met crushing opposition from both the American Medical Association and the

26
See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 18, at 19–63 (analyzing the gendered ideal of the right to work in the
early twentieth century).
27
WOLOCH, supra note 20, at 18–20.
28
On masculinity and free-labor ideology, see generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (1988); LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN
WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER SOCIETY (1997); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
29
JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND
THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 33–42 (2004).
30
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 18, at 74–88.
31
Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, Childbirth and Childrearing Leave: Job-Related Benefits, 17 N.Y. L.F. 480,
482–83, 483 nn.16–19 (1971).
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private insurance industry.32 The presumption of masculine invulnerability,
therefore, underpinned a liberal welfare regime that conceptualized private
responsibility for dependency as primary, and public social insurance as
exceptional and supplemental.
Meanwhile, maternalist labor regulation did ultimately serve as the wedge
that cracked open the door to federal labor regulation. The 1937 case of West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish marked the “switch in time,” signaling the Court’s turn
to legitimate the constitutionality of New Deal labor and social regulation.33 In
the 1923 case Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia, the
Supreme Court had struck down the District of Columbia’s minimum-wage law
for women.34 The majority opinion reasoned that, in contrast to limits on work
hours, there existed no clear nexus between minimum wages and women
workers’ health. In addition, the Court concluded that progress in the civil and
political status of women culminating in the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment had eliminated the justification for government interference in
women’s freedom of contract.35 The Court in West Coast Hotel, however,
reversed Adkins. In addition to protecting women’s health, the state had an
interest in mitigating the burden on communities created by the need subsidize
women workers exploited in the labor market.36 A revolution in constitutional
jurisprudence enabled reformers to dust off proposals for federal maximum-hour
and minimum-wage regulations, which they had stowed away in response to
earlier Court decisions hostile to the New Deal. In 1938, Congress passed the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which enshrined a forty-four hour workweek
(reduced to forty hours three years later) with mandatory overtime pay for
additional hours; prohibited the transport in interstate commerce of goods
produced by child labor; and instituted a flat minimum wage for covered workers
across industries.37
Although formally race and sex-neutral, the FLSA was far from universal.
Roosevelt struck a devil’s bargain with Southern Democrats, yielding a final bill
that excluded agricultural and domestic workers as well as workers in food
processing, packing, and transportation, government employees, not-for-profit
employees, and seamen. The FLSA extended federal protection to only 20% of

32

See KLEIN, supra note 13, at 211–16.
See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 177 (1995).
34
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
35
Id. at 552–53.
36
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–400 (1937).
37
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
33
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workers—14% of women compared to 39% of men—and covered almost no
African-American workers.38 The minimum wage set in 1938, twenty-five cents
an hour, was so low as to fall below some regional standards. In addition, the
FLSA prohibited discrimination in wage rates between men and women. Yet,
ongoing sex segregation in the labor market, and the exclusions embedded in the
FLSA itself, meant this provision had more symbolic than practical import.39
The liberal welfare state’s blindness to universal vulnerability both
entrenched gender and racial hierarchies and undermined state responsibility to
workers more broadly. Policymakers had modeled federal labor law and social
insurance mechanisms on the paradigmatic white, male industrial worker. They
denied protection to the majority of women and minority workers by categorical
(although formally race and sex neutral) exclusion. Moreover, the social welfare
mechanisms that emerged were constrained by their administration as a benefit
of private employment, rather than as a right of citizenship. Meanwhile, state
labor law offered protections to women workers only, premised on the model of
feminine biological and social vulnerability. Law and policy did not
conceptualize men as similarly subject to constant—rather than exceptional—
physical instability and as caregivers who required social supports for their
family and civic responsibilities. State labor law—meant to protect those who
fell outside the paradigmatic liberal male subject—was gendered feminine.
II. SEX-NEUTRALITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF (IN)VULNERABILITY IN
THE NEOLIBERAL LABOR REGIME
Fineman’s theory further enriches the legal history of the U.S. welfare
regime by exposing the limits of antidiscrimination law. Fineman argues that the
claim to nondiscrimination poses no challenge to a minimal welfare state that
fails to provide adequate education, health care, food, housing, and other
fundamental social goods.40 Fineman’s work causes us to interrogate further the
limits of the anti-stereotyping theory that dominates contemporary scholarship
on sex equality. Anti-stereotyping theory is undeniably more capacious than
formal equality, as it destabilizes the very construction of what counts as
“masculine” and “feminine.” Anti-stereotyping promotes women’s capacity to
fulfill a role as breadwinners, entering traditionally male fields in both industrial
and blue-collar work. It also furthers men’s capacity to fulfill their roles as
38
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 18, at 106; see IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 263–72 (2013).
39
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 18, at 115–16.
40
See Martha Albertson Fineman, Introducing Vulnerability, in VULNERABILITY AND THE LEGAL
ORGANIZATION OF WORK, supra note 1, at 1, 2–3.

DINNER GALLEYPROOFS2

1158

6/22/2018 10:02 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1149

caregivers, requiring the extension of public and private benefits for caregiving
on a sex-neutral basis. Anti-stereotyping, however, cannot place a demand on
either the state or employers to enhance support for caregiving. The theory
leaves intact institutional arrangements that make the private family, rather than
the larger society, responsible for biological and derivative dependency.41
This insight helped to inspire my recent article, which shows how sexdiscrimination law in the late twentieth century intertwined with retrenchment
in the welfare state and cutbacks in labor protections. The anti-stereotyping logic
of sex discrimination law shares with neoliberalism concepts of individual
freedom, market-based efficiency, and a minimal state. My article challenges
the pervasive narrative in the historical literature that the demise of maternalist
labor standards marked the dawn of a new era of sex equality. Instead, I show
that the use of sex-equality law to erode maternalism left both working-class
women and men, who labor outside the reach of federal protections, in positions
of deepening precarity.42
While Fineman argues that the logic of antidiscrimination obscures universal
vulnerability, my work shows that the coincidence of antidiscrimination and
neoliberal trends was contingent rather than inevitable. In the late twentieth
century, the ascendance of sex equality as a legal ideal held the potential to
transform the liberal welfare regime. Law might assimilate previously excluded
groups—women and racial minorities—to a labor regime premised upon
masculine independence. Alternatively, sex equality might catalyze the
remaking of the welfare regime in recognition of the biological and social
vulnerability of men as well as women. Labor feminists pursued this latter ideal,
endeavoring to couple new antidiscrimination mandates with enhanced labor
protections. Business, however, mobilized to defeat their claims and to wield
Title VII as a tool to deregulate the employment relationship. Judges made
interpretive decisions that limited the redistributive scope of antidiscrimination
statutes. In sum, law and policy jettisoned ideals of feminine vulnerability and
embraced conceptions of sex-neutral invulnerability.43
Shifts in the economy, law, and society placed increasing expectations on
women to assume the role of breadwinner. The postwar period, often considered
a time of unparalleled national affluence, also saw an increase in consumption
41
For the definition of biological and derivative dependency, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 35–38 (2004).
42
Dinner, supra note 15, at 1062–64.
43
See generally DEBORAH DINNER, CONTESTED LABOR: GENDER AND THE LAW IN NEOLIBERAL
AMERICA (forthcoming 2019); Dinner, supra note 15.
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standards. Married women faced heightened pressure to maintain full-time
employment to pay for their children’s college educations—newly important to
enter the middle class—as well as for the growing cost of health care. The
number of married white women who worked outside the home increased from
12.5% in 1940 to 20.7% in 1950, and 29.8% in 1960.44 Workforce participation
rates for married women of color were higher and, likewise, climbing: from
27.3% in 1940, to 31.8% in 1950, to 40.5% in 1960.45 In addition, rising divorce
rates and delayed marriage also made women’s income crucial to families’
economic security.46 Changing patterns of women’s labor-force attachment
normalized women’s dual role as workers and caregivers.
In a transforming labor market, working women’s interest in employment
opportunity converged with employers’ interest in greater managerial freedom.
As working women’s economic and social roles in their families evolved, their
calculus regarding maternalist labor law shifted. Low-income, nonunionized
female workers, in retail and service sectors of the economy not covered by
federal labor law, were more likely to continue to prioritize maternalist labor
protections. By the mid-1960s, however, other working women began to smart
under the constraints of maternalist-protection and maximum-hours laws, in
particular. They did not embrace long hours uncritically, but they wanted the
higher pay that came with overtime work and with access to the jobs long
reserved for male workers.47 After the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, women’s rights consciousness deepened. Working women began
to file lawsuits in federal district courts that gave them access to the kinds of
industrial jobs previously deemed male preserves.
At the same time, employers also deployed Title VII as a deregulatory tool.
Employers opposed maternalist labor standards because they interfered in
managerial freedom, held potential to increase employers’ costs in femaledominated industries, and trapped employers between liabilities imposed by
state and federal law. For example, in the case of Homemakers, Inc. of Los

44
CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN
WOMEN 16–17 (1990).
45
Id.
46
Divorce rates spiked following the end of World War II, and then fell in the late 1950s and early 1960s
to rates lower than those of the last century (less than 10 per 1,000 married couples). Betsey Stevenson & Justin
Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 28–29 (2007).
Divorce rates then climbed steadily, “doubling between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s.” Id. at 28. See also Sheela
Kennedy & Steven Ruggles, Breaking Up Is Hard to Count: The Rise of Divorce in the United States, 1980–2010, 51
DEMOGRAPHY 587, 589 (2014).
47
See Deborah Dinner, Equal by What Measure? The Lost Struggle for Universal State Protective Labor
Standards, in VULNERABILITY AND THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK, supra note 1, at 283, 285–86.
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Angeles v. Division of Industrial Welfare, a division of Upjohn Pharmaceutical
Company deployed Title VII to challenge a California law requiring overtime
pay for female employees.48 As the district court observed, the employer’s
motives were self-serving.49 Homemakers, Inc. employed an overwhelmingly
female workforce that provided housekeeping and practical nursing services to
individuals and local governments. The company’s challenge to the overtime
law would enable it to pay its own employees less. In the 1970 case Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, Caterpillar Tractor and Illinois Bell Telephone
successfully argued that a sex-specific maximum-hours law violated Title VII
by depriving women of the opportunities men enjoyed to earn additional
income.50 The next year, General Electric Co. and the International Union of
Electrical Workers together litigated in Kentucky to win the right to give women
workers overtime assignments.51 By defining sex equality as the elimination of
gender stereotypes, these lawsuits re-categorized women workers as isolated,
independent breadwinners. In this process, society lost an opportunity to
transform workplace structures that make work and family conflict—structures
that were historically shaped through gender ideologies but which sex neutrality
disguised rather than exposed.52
That the end of maternalism intertwined historically with the contraction,
rather than the expansion, of the welfare state proved especially consequential
as the nation transitioned from an industrial to a service economy. Law and
society expected women as well as men to conform to the model of the industrial
breadwinner. Yet increasing numbers of low-income workers occupied
feminized sectors of the economy, toiling within contingent retail and service
sectors. With the erosion of maternalism, feminists and labor activists lost an
ideological foothold on state labor protection. Even with the 1974 extension of
the FLSA to agricultural and domestic workers, significant sectors of the labor
force, today, remain outside the protection of federal labor law. These workers
are disproportionately women of color; many are global migrants. From this
vantage point, the erosion of maternalist labor standards marks a turning point
in the deepening precarity of workers. As historian Katherine Turk shows in her

48
Id. at 299; see also Homemakers, Inc. of L.A., v. Div. of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111, 1113
(N.D. Cal. 1973).
49
Homemakers, 356 F. Supp. at 1113 (suggesting that “this Court may question the motives of [the]
plaintiff and sympathize with its women employees”).
50
317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
51
WOLOCH, supra note 20, at 214–15.
52
See Dinner, supra note 15, at 1078–82.
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path-breaking new book, Equality on Trial, the gendered divide in the workplace
became a class divide in the last decades of the twentieth century.53
III. UNIVERSAL, CONSTANT VULNERABILITY, AND HISTORICAL
CONTINGENCY
The last utility of vulnerability theory to the legal history of the U.S. welfare
regime is perhaps the most important. Like her art, Fineman’s theory helps to
reveal the negative spaces in this history: alternative ideas, institutional forms,
and laws that might have transformed legal liberalism. Attention to universal
vulnerability as a heuristic device illuminates historical moments of dissent and
contingency. Here, I sketch such moments in which labor feminist activists
mobilized a discourse of universal vulnerability.
As sex-discrimination law eroded maternalist labor legislation in the late
1960s and early 1970s, labor feminists fought to extend these laws from women
to men. Many working-class women and their advocates viewed the advent of
sex equality norms as a mechanism to expand the scope of state labor standards.
They sought to fuse a Civil Rights era commitment to antidiscrimination with
an earlier social-welfare tradition that dated to the Progressive and New Deal
eras. Universal state protective laws were especially important in light of the
limitations of federal labor law. These laws might extend protections to workers
in the retail, service, and other contingent sectors of the economy who were
excluded from coverage under the FLSA. In addition, labor advocates sought
maximum-hour limitations, which would offer employees categorical protection
from mandatory overtime work, even as the FLSA’s premium pay requirement
weakened as a disincentive to longer hours.54
Labor feminists endeavored to substitute a political understanding of
universal vulnerability in place of maternalist justifications for state protection.
In advocating maximum-hours laws for all workers, male and female, they
argued that it was immoral to require some workers to work overtime while other
workers—disproportionately women and minorities—were unemployed. They
also sought to replace the gendered argument that mothers needed limits on work
hours, with the sex-neutral argument that all workers needed “leisure time to be

53
See generally KATHERINE TURK, EQUALITY ON TRIAL: GENDER AND RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2016).
54
As work benefits accounted for a greater proportion of employment costs and salaries a lesser
proportion, the premium pay requirement of the FLSA weakened as an incentive for employers to hire additional
workers rather than increase hours.
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with their families, for living and relaxing.”55 Universal overtime laws would
foster workers’ capacity “to perform their duties as citizens.”56 Last, labor
advocates adapted an ideal of worker self-ownership, with roots in antebellum
free-labor ideology, to argue for the importance of state mitigation of employers’
power over workers’ time. These arguments failed because of employer
opposition and because of the difficulty of generating political support for the
ideal of universal vulnerability. Rather than reconstructing male workers as
vulnerable, state labor law instead constructed female workers as independent
and autonomous. Over the course of the 1970s, at least five states—California,
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Oregon, and Rhode Island—considered voluntary
overtime legislation, yet no state passed it.57
CONCLUSION: TEACHING THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE WELFARE STATE
While Fineman’s vulnerability theory powerfully informs my research, it is
in teaching that I gained the greatest appreciation for its potential as a conceptual
frame for the legal history of the welfare state. This past year, I taught a seminar
titled “Family, State, and Vulnerability.” We began by reading one of Fineman’s
essays on vulnerability theory,58 coupled with T.H. Marshall’s classic essay
Citizenship and Social Class,59 as well as excerpts from an article by Janet
Halley interrogating the distinctions between family law and social welfare
policy in the law-school curriculum.60 The purpose of these three foundational
pieces was to establish a shared understanding of the ideas of vulnerability,
social citizenship, and the socially constructed boundaries of legal jurisdiction.
We then proceeded on a tour of U.S. welfare state history, beginning with
debates about American exceptionalism and the hybrid character of the public–
private welfare regime. We discussed widows’ pensions in the postbellum
period, maternalism in the Progressive Era, the role of race and gender in
shaping New Deal welfare policy, the expansion and limitations of social
citizenship in the postwar era, holes in the safety net created by the Great
Society, and the civil rights and feminist revolutions, among other topics.

55
Dinner, supra note 15, at 1078 (quoting Dorothy Haener, Int’l Representative, Int’l Union, UAW,
Statement at Public Hearing to the Mich. Occupational Standards Comm’n 7 (Aug. 19, 1968) (on file with Walter
P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s Department Papers)).
56
Id.
57
See Dinner, supra note 47, at 304.
58
Fineman, supra note 12, at 13–27.
59
T.H. MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, in CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 65
(1964).
60
Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1–6 (2011).
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Throughout the course, we returned repeatedly to the question of how policy
responded or failed to respond to universal vulnerability.
The ways in which my students engaged and interrogated Fineman’s theory
consistently impressed and instructed me. The class, as an entirety, grew
engrossed by the double-bind of the U.S. welfare state—at each moment that the
state expanded the scope of its protections and the bounds of social and
economic citizenship, it also reinforced race and gender hierarchies. Students
drew different conclusions from this dynamic, and some held fast to the goal of
state recognition of universal human vulnerability. Others drew from the history
lessons in skepticism and remained continually wary of the state’s purposes and
the capacity for advocates to instantiate more egalitarian concepts of protection.
On the last day, the debate continued, and we remained energized. That is what
I take as Martha Albertson Fineman’s greatest inspiration as a teacher and
theorist: her unending enthusiasm for learning, commitment to teaching, and
dedication to questioning what we easily understand as true. Her scholarship can
help to make the negative spaces in our own understanding come alive with new
questions.

